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Abstract
Three-dimensional printing is on the verge of introducing security agencies globally to a whole new set of
mind-boggling problems. These machines are quickly overcoming hurdles in the path of crafting nuclear
centrifuge components. Further, with the tremendous reach of the Internet worldwide, virtual blueprints
for small arms, drone components and accessories, narcotic drugs and psychoactive substances, as well as
dual-use items can be printed out by individuals or organizations that have access to good 3D printers.
Modern technological innovation is currently outpacing the legislative response from legal institutions
and security systems, both of which must be revamped in order to tackle impending threats on the
horizon. Though 3D printing is one of a slew of these new technologies that require scrutiny (others
include artificial intelligence and quantum or nanotechnologies), updating the Multilateral Export Control
Regimes well in time to mitigate novel trade control challenges posed by 3D printing is the need of the
hour. This article details the imminent security threats in this world of manufacturing evolution and
revolution and proposes various methods to address and counteract those threats.

I.

Introduction

Three-dimensional printers—the magical devices capable of printing prosthetics, violins, and even
aircraft parts—have the potential, as US President Barack Obama observed, “to revolutionize the way we
make almost everything.” The flipside to all their good uses, however, is the fact that these same
machines can be used to create weapons and other harmful substances and equipment that can be used
with pernicious intent. While not easily accessible to most people even today, 3D printing (its technical
term is additive manufacturing) is in fact a reality that is becoming more sophisticated at every instant.
This paper tries to answer the question of whether increased availability of this technology amounts to an
increased slew of security challenges. The paper also asks the question: does the possibility of weapons
proliferation posed by 3D printing—and the concomitant security challenges—outweigh the usefulness of
the technology? Probably not yet. Nonetheless, despite the multifaceted advantages 3D printing brings to
scientific advancement, I argue that security threats resulting from it are multiplying exponentially, and
that 3D printing is detrimental to international security and could present a veritable nightmare for
security agencies.
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Three-dimensional printing is already being used in the nuclear industry, for instance, at the Sellafield
reactor in the UK, where 3D scanning and printing technologies have been used in the manufacture of
metal lids for low-level waste containers to move waste around the site [1]. In India, the Department of
Atomic Energy is headed by the Prime Minister, and the Raja Ramanna Centre for Advanced Technology
located at Indore, functioning under this department, has crafted nuclear components for the reprocessing
plant and the Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor at the Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research,
Kalpakkam, India [2]. As the technology matures, the relative simplicity and economy of 3D printing
technology could make it the industry standard for manufacturing. This seems to be the appropriate time
for world governments to cooperate on how best to regulate the hazardous aspects of 3D printing and
contemplate the future of strategic trade controls with respect to this technology before its use becomes
more widespread. Regulatory measures require careful chalking out well before the problem becomes
ubiquitous. Prevention is better than cure.
This paper thus focuses on an important yet relatively little-researched topic—namely the importance of
developing adequate trade control laws and enforcement for 3D printing—and consequently examines the
challenges posed by 3D printing to nuclear and global security. It also recommends modifications to the
current international export control regime that would aim to mitigate associated security threats. The first
section of the article introduces the topic and highlights the historical development of 3D printing,
including its growth in various countries; it also provides information on the manufacturers, their
profitability, their location, and their focus on other products. A literature review follows in the second
section, discussing other articles in academic journals related to 3D printing and how this article differs
from those articles. The next section focuses on different challenges and benefits of 3D printing and its
various applications, while the fourth section discusses examples of “new” products in the past which
introduced similar challenges to those introduced by 3D printing, and how those challenges were handled
in the past. The final section suggests strategies and recommends ways to tackle these challenges posed
by 3D printing. While this paper faithfully catalogs the various security challenges of 3D printing so far
conceived, it also builds upon previous literature in two ways. First, it traces which nations are the
primary manufacturers of 3D printers and thus provides a picture of the global hubs of 3D printing
technology. Second, it focuses on various proliferation pathways previously not explored in detail—the
most sensitive ones relating to nuclear technology and missile component manufacturing (as most
research looks at gun control only)—to try to determine whether the extant legal and regulatory
frameworks for countering those pathways are sufficiently robust, and then offers policy
recommendations based on that analysis.

II.

What is 3D Printing?

In layman’s language, additive manufacturing, or 3D printing, is a process of making three-dimensional
solid objects from a digital file. The creation of a 3D printed object is achieved using additive processes.
An object is created by laying down successive layers of material until the entire object is created. It all
starts with making a virtual design of the object one wishes to create. This virtual design is made in a
Computer Aided Design (CAD) or a Stereolithography (STL —a proprietary format of the company 3D
Systems) file using a 3D modeling program for the creation of a totally new object, or with the use of a
3D scanner to copy an existing object. To prepare a digital file for printing, the 3D modeling software
“slices” the final model into hundreds or thousands of horizontal layers. The object can be created layer
by layer. The 3D printer reads every slice (or 2D image) and creates the object, blending each layer with
hardly any visible sign of the layers, resulting in the 3D object. Initially, 3D printers could print using
only a single material at a time. Today the technology has changed dramatically to allow multiple
materials to be used in printing at the same time, and new technology advancements could soon allow
objects to be used immediately after printing [3].
Today, there exist two broad categories of 3D printing in terms of the scale of the final product:
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(1) Personal Printing – This is primarily for hobbyists and enthusiasts. It started growing in 2011.
Rapid developments within this new market make printers cheaper and cheaper, with prices
typically in the range of $250 – $2,500. This makes 3D printers affordable to a greater number of
people, even those in the middle-class income bracket. It would be a cause for concern if
blueprints of sensitive/high tech items were to land in wrong hands.
(2) Industrial Printing – Large 3D printers have been developed for industrial, educational, and
demonstrative uses. A type of large printer is the Big Area Additive Manufacturing (BAAM)
type. The current goal is to develop printers that can produce objects up to 100 feet long in high
speed (Lockheed Martin, Cincinnati Inc.). There is cause for concern here in that mushrooming
companies with no internal compliance programs may export dual-use products from their
industrial 3D printers.
Current filament types used in 3D printing are particular kinds of polymers—Acrylonitrile butadiene
styrene (ABS) or Polylactic acid (PLA). Certain printers, like the Mark One, can also use carbon fiber,
fiberglass and even Kevlar. However, there is an increasing proclivity towards 3D printers which can also
process other, more complex materials such as ceramics, biological tissue, metals, powders, etc. There are
a few types of metal printing technologies such as stereolithography, Fused Deposition Modeling (FDM),
inkjet bioprinting [4], Selective Laser Sintering (SLS), Selective Laser Melting (SLM) and Direct Metal
Laser Sintering [5], which can 3D print a wide array of metals, including stainless steel, titanium, Inconel
(a nickel-chromium alloy), maraging steel (a class of low-carbon, high-nickel stainless steel that has been
precipitation-hardened or ‘aged’). Some 3D printers can even process human tissue. There is already a
plethora of sensitive areas that are associated with 3D printing today, such as aerospace, automotive,
bioengineering and biomedical devices, chemical engineering, electrical-mechanical systems, the fashion
industry, industrial manufacturing, internet, machine technology, materials, nanotechnology,
pharmaceuticals, robotics, semiconductors, software, textiles, and wearable technology [6]. Further,
NASA has gone to the extent of funding an experimental machine for 3D printing pizza [7].
The major difference between 3D printing and traditional manufacturing is that while in traditional
manufacturing subtractive processes are typically used, such as cutting, drilling, milling or grinding, 3D
printing is an additive process that fuses materials, layer on layer, using a combination of heat, chemicals,
light, electron beams, or adhesives [6].
According to the website investingnews.com, the 3D printing industry is slated to breach the $30 billion
mark by 2022 [8]. Though it is still a niche area with few companies of the world engaged in it, some
large multinationals, such as Hewlett-Packard, are showing interest in diversifying their businesses with
3D printing. The largest 3D printing companies—as well as the largest number of 3D printing
companies—such as 3D Systems and Stratasys, are based in the USA, while many others operate in
Europe, and still others in Canada, China, Japan and the UAE. Chinese authorities in Chongqing have
taken the step of having all 3D printing companies register their businesses with the local police in order
to monitor any suspicious output [9].

III. Literature Review
A large corpus of research on the potential hazards of 3D printing technology has been directed at the
manufacture of guns, rifles, and other small arms. For instance, S. Magnuson, in his brief write-up on 3D
printing, observes that prices of 3D printers are drastically decreasing to reach to the point that hobbyists
and enthusiasts are beginning to be able to afford them. That fact, he argues, coupled with companies like
Shapeways Manufacturing—which custom-makes 3D printed products for online customers, often
without knowing what they are manufacturing or how a customer might use that product—raises security
concerns. Three-dimensional printing could change the way products are distributed the way MP3s
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changed how music was consumed [10]. Others in the early days of 3D printed gun manufacture felt there
was no significant new threat posed by this technology. Gerald Walther in 2013 observed that 3D printed
guns did not threaten to cause significant harm because they were in the nascent stages of development
and not greatly effective [11].
The threat, however, is from more than just firearms. As the website The Conversation has noted,
countries (or non-state actors, I would add) “seeking to develop nuclear weapons could use 3D printing to
evade international safeguards against nuclear proliferation. Traditional nuclear weapon control efforts
include watching international markets for sales of components needed for manufacturing a nuclear
device. Additional measures place restrictions on the types of technology nuclear-capable states can
export. 3D printing could avoid these efforts by letting countries make the equipment themselves, instead
of buying it abroad.” Scholar Grant Christopher recommends that governments as well as the Nuclear
Suppliers Group (NSG) introduce export controls for 3D printers based on certain parameters [12].
Christopher further observes that technical experts need to work hand in hand with policymakers to
address the issue of regulating 3D printing technology at the earliest stage before a Pandora’s box opens
[12]. Matthew Kroenig, of Georgetown University, and Tristan Volpe, of the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, asserted in a jointly authored article that there is still time for the United States to
spearhead an international effort to contain the 3D printing genie in the bottle, particularly as its
proliferation potential has not yet fully materialized [13].
Some, but by no means exhaustive, research has also been done on 3D printing of nuclear weapons
components, the state of the current export control frameworks meant to keep up nonproliferation, and
how they measure up against this new technology. Among the highly educative recent works in this
category is one by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) that has analyzed a set of
export-controlled items to understand the degree to which 3D printing might be used to produce dual-use
goods useful for the development of WMDs. They analyze this issue at three different levels: the “item”
level, the “legal user” level, and the “illicit user” level. At the item level, this study did not find any
evidence that 3D printing is being used to support WMD development actively. At the legal user level, it
finds that 3D printing technology is proliferating. Finally, the illicit user level results are similar to the
item level results. However, this technology, it observes, is within the reach of the Islamic State (IS) or
North Korea, should they wish to actively pursue developing weapons using 3D printing [14].
Numerous international laws have been propounded across countries, usually in line with the Multilateral
Export Control Regimes (MECRs), to reduce, if not stop, proliferation of weapons technologies,
especially from getting into the hands of terrorist organization. However, the efficacy of these laws has
yet to be fully proven as even today there are numerous instances of stabbings, shootings, cyberattacks
and statements of intent to use nuclear weapons on the part of terrorist groups. One example of the latter
was Osama bin Laden’s statement termed "The Nuclear Bomb of Islam," which declared that, "It is the
duty of Muslims to prepare as much force as possible to terrorize the enemies of God” [15].
While not reinventing the wheel, it is still appropriate to point out that so long as these technologies do
exist, there will always remain a certain level of threat and discomfort. The same is the case with 3D
printing. What is critical to know about this technology is that it will remain a double-edged sword as
long as it exists. The times one lives in and the technology prevalent in those times are deciding factors in
what issues will take center stage in that period. The early 21st Century is the time of, among other things,
3D printing. The technology has steadily advanced to the point that several guns and critical components
for semi-automatic rifles have been manufactured, and the US army is also developing a new, 3D printed
grenade launcher. With that in mind, the naysayers claiming that 3D printing does not pose any threat
should reconsider their arguments. This paper argues that 3D printing indeed presents security
challenges—and it proposes solutions.
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IV. Theory: The Black and White of 3D Printing
3D printing, as originally intended, is indeed a game-changing technology that has the potential to create
new opportunities and change human lifestyle for the better in various ways. It is often referred to as
something that will herald the next industrial revolution. Dentists can make dental crowns and on-site
bridges in about an hour, cranial bones can be fixed without waiting for metal plates, and custom-made
prosthetics can be created swiftly and economically [16]. Three-dimensional printed medical implants are
being used already for veterinary purposes [17]. Cost-effective fabrications of medical components, car
parts, fuel cells, costumes, aviation parts (such as for GE’s commercial jet engines), rocket engines, and
lesser dependence on trade with other countries attributed to production self-sufficiency are slated to be
the primary advancements.
Other key benefits of 3D printing include customizing products, reducing production time, localizing
production and reducing logistical woes, such as eliminating the need to transport component parts
required for manufacture when those different parts could be manufactured in-house with 3D printing.
The US Navy’s Chief of Naval Operations’ Rapid Innovation Cell (CRIC) started the ‘Print the Fleet’
program in 2013, and as of 2014, there were 60 additive manufacturing-related projects in the US Navy.
The head of the 3D printing program, Jim Lambeth, stated, “Really what the project aims to do is develop
procedures and policies for printing parts, how to qualify the parts, deliver the parts … and how to use
these printers” [18]. More recently, in 2016, a California-based company called Make in Space provided
the second 3D printer to the International Space Station so that a wrench could be manufactured in space
without having to wait for supplies from earth. Now other tools can be created by the astronauts in space
using the printer as well [19]. In another instance, the US Marine Corps Commandant declared that his
teams would not have to carry their tents anymore and instead could simply print them when they arrived
at their destinations [20]. Further, the Contour Crafting technology developed at the University of
Southern California is being used in conjunction with NASA to print 2,000 sq. ft. homes in less than a
day’s time. If successful, this could be another “giant leap for mankind” with bases far more easily
constructed with local moon materials as opposed to shipping the material from earth, costs of which are
exorbitant: a single pound of raw material from earth to the moon costs roughly $100,000 with current
technology [21].
While the possibilities of using 3D printers for benevolent and innocuous ends are limitless, the light at
the end of the tunnel could also mean a train is coming. This danger is exacerbated by the fact that
traditional export controls deal with tangible technology, while a major part of 3D printing technology
deals with Intangible Technology Transfer (ITT) of digital file blueprints that would then be used to
produce an object. Thus, according to a Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) study,
“controls on technology mean that transfers of the build files used to produce 3D printed objects could
require a license if the items they describe are themselves subject to control and they provide a knowledge
transfer beyond the pure geometry of the object, for example, the technology for specific processes and
finishing procedures that make the item more heat-resistant.” The difficulty therein is that this law is
interpreted and implemented differently in different states [22]. Further, the printers themselves and the
software they use to produce objects are not export controlled yet [22]. Controls need to be implemented
and perhaps could be applied at the printer, the material, or at the file level—or on all those levels. Thus,
the many legal and regulatory frameworks governing dual-use technologies can only minimally, and
inadequately, ameliorate the proliferation and security challenges posed by 3D printing.

V.

Hypothesis

Instances of 3D printing have already generated threats to security, and in some cases have resulted in
security breaches. Three-dimensional printing could make extant export control laws and border security
methods obsolete as the digital domain becomes embodied in physical objects. Further, this new
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technology could have implications for the future of nuclear security. This leads me to the hypothesis I
propose to test:
HA: The proliferation of 3D printing technology will lead to heightened security and export control
challenges globally.
My independent variable (X) is thus proliferation of 3D printing technology and my dependent variable
(Y) is heightened security and export control challenges globally. The illustrations provided in the theory
section testify to evidence of a causal connection between the variables X and Y in the real world.
As the US Department of Homeland Security has rightly observed, “Significant advances in 3D printing
capabilities, availability of free digital 3D printable files for firearms components, and difficulty
regulating file sharing may present public safety risks from unqualified gun seekers who obtain or
manufacture 3D printed guns," and "proposed legislation to ban 3D printing of weapons may deter but
cannot completely prevent their production. Even if the practice is prohibited by new legislation, online
distribution of these 3D printable files will be as difficult to control as any other illegally traded music,
movie or software files.” Here, the Department refers to only one potential concern with 3D printing.
However, the complexity of the issue is far greater. Several other risks to strategic trade controls posed by
3D printing can be identified, one among them being printed handguns and rifles. However, the greater
threat, though harder to achieve, is the possibility of crafting nuclear centrifuge parts. It is a pertinent
worry as long as a well-funded terrorist organization such as the Islamic State (IS) exist.

VI. Maraging Steel in Nuclear Reactor Centrifuge
Maraging steel, mentioned earlier, is a key component used in the nuclear fuel cycle as it has the relevant
characteristics required for centrifuges used to enrich uranium—in particular, maraging steel can be used
to create the rotor, baffles and endcaps. Concerning high-strength materials, only high-strength aluminum,
maraging steel, and carbon fiber are free from any strategic trade control laws for possible use in
centrifuges. Though 3D printing maraging steel is not as simple as ‘click and print’ from the CAD file—
because the required dimensions must be replicated with close to one hundred percent density to keep the
strength of the material intact—hurdles in the path of producing 3D printed maraging steel with properties
comparable to manufactured maraging steel are gradually being overcome. Three-dimensional printers
currently capable of producing maraging steel are limited to a handful only, such as the EOS M series [5],
the Matsuura Lumex Avance-25 [23], Renishaw AM250 [24], SLM 280 or SLM 500 [25] and Concept
Laser machines [26]. As the mists clear over the processes of 3D printing and existing procedures are
parametrically refined, it becomes gradually more conceivable that the current generation of 3D printers
could be used to manufacture key components of some of the sensitive and controlled technologies in the
nuclear fuel cycle [12]. The current crop of carbon fiber, aluminum, or plastics resistant to the corrosive
UF6 chemical at present may not be able to create the required centrifuge—perhaps because of strict
geometric quality requirements (for 3D printed carbon fiber), higher tensile strength (for 3D printed
aluminum), or a lack of effective melting upon heating (for 3D printed, fully-fluorinated plastics), and a
metal printer would cost around $7,500,000 and take 1–2 days to manufacture the 3D printed centrifuge
[12].
Nonetheless, developments of the technology in this direction should be monitored because of the
motivation, and even partial capability, of certain terrorist groups to acquire nuclear weapons. The recent
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) report on 3D printing succinctly sums up why:
“Although we lack evidence about whether AM has hitherto been used by any non-state actor (or even by
a state) in WMD production, the aerospace industry is using the technology to produce precision
components of high significance and utility. This underlines a genuine concern that the technology can be
used for construction of components related to critical weapons or even a nuclear device… since AM
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requires only the blueprint and 3D printer, it reduces the technical threshold required for manufacturing
the necessary material and even constructing the weapons. It subsequently affects strategic trade because
it reduces the dependence on conventional illicit trade networks substantially. In addition, 3D printing
requires only a small space instead of a big manufacturing facility. The dual-use nature of 3D printing
exempts it from many export control limitations and makes the technology easily accessible to anyone,
including terrorist groups… this problem is compounded by the fact that the technology is already present
in Makerspaces that are within the operational spheres of potential WMD terrorists, creating easy access
and potential for misuse” [14].
This implies that a terrorist organization such as the Islamic State could use their considerable financial
resources and smuggling and black-market networks to potentially gain access to this technology
available in countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region such as Morocco, Egypt or
even closer to Pakistan in South Asia. IS apparently has the capabilities to build Improvised Explosive
Devices (IEDs) and weaponized drones on a quasi-industrial scale [27]. “More surprising is the fact that it
has cobbled together a supply-chain network involving some fifty companies spanning over twenty
countries. There is documented evidence that within this network, Turkey has been the chokepoint of this
illicit procurement supply chain, which raises the possibility that the IS possesses the ability to illicitly
procure AM technology and related material through Turkey” [14].

VII. Microchips and Guided Missiles
Microchips with applications in sensitive systems and other sophisticated technology could similarly end
up in unwanted hands. The major US defense contractor Raytheon has recently manufactured most parts
of a guided missile through 3D printing as part of a $523 million contract from the US Department of
Defense [28]. According to Raytheon, “Engineers are exploring the use of 3-D printing to lay down
conductive materials for electrical circuits, create housings for the company's revolutionary gallium
nitride transmitters, and fabricate fins for guided artillery shells. … [R]ocket engines, fins, parts for the
guidance and control systems, and more” have already been manufactured with this technology [28]. The
outstanding benefits of 3D printing then are the far shorter production cycles, cost effectiveness, easier
supply chain with fewer pieces—all this versus traditional manufacturing methods. The costs in
manufacturing these components are cut down drastically because unlike regular manufacture, which is
subtractive in nature (removing unwanted sections of expensive parts), additive manufacturing results
only in addition of the required parts, leading to negligible waste or to no waste at all.
While there is still time, and while manufacturers are still grappling with the production of the remaining
parts (metallic strongbacks, plastic connectors, semiconductors for processors, electronic circuits,
microwave components, and propulsion systems) and in making the connections between these parts, it
may help the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), one of the MECRs, if more detailed analysis
could be done in this field by scrutinizing which components of ballistic missiles can be crafted in the
present moment, or in the near future, using existing 3D printing, with the aim of bringing those
components under binding export control laws.

VIII.

3D Printed Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW)

Three-dimensional printed small arms such as handguns and crossbows may well be a source of major
hazard, as blueprint files are already freely available online. Piratebay.org hosted downloadable “The
Liberator” diagrams long after Cody Wilson was asked to take them off his Defense Distributed website.
Many individuals have threatened harm to the United States upon acquiring gun blueprints [29]. This
could be a hoax, but, if true, could lead to tragic consequences if left unattended. Downloads of the plans
from the UK, Germany, Spain, and Brazil were considerable. Further, plastic guns are invisible to metal
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detectors and X-Ray machines, which could prove to be a challenge for Customs worldwide unless
personnel are sufficiently trained and appropriately equipped in advance.
In countries like Japan, the United Kingdom and Australia, among others, where there are strict controls
on guns, people may choose to print the weapons as a way to circumvent existing controls. Guns would
not have to be physically imported; weapons without serial numbers do not require background checks to
acquire and can be manufactured at home if a decent 3D printer is available. Considering the fact that the
availability of 3D printing is growing exponentially, and that the human brain has limitless potential, it is
reasonably to ask how long it might take for mankind to reach the stage where we will be printing rocket
launchers or even more devastating weapons. In the case of recent terrorist attacks, whether in Mumbai
(2008) or Paris (2015), guns and other munitions may have been bought, legally or illegally. What
happens if the same terror groups acquire the knowhow to 3D print the required weapons based on
blueprints available online, and there are no existing serial numbers associated with the weapons in order
to trace them? Border checks on arms smuggling would become increasingly ineffective. Applying for
gun licenses would become meaningless. The danger can spread swiftly. In June 2015 in Hong Kong a
group of terrorists with a 3D printer, bombs and guns was apprehended. Numerous handguns, rifles and
rifle parts have already been produced around the world, with the great majority coming from the United
States.
Varieties of 3D printed SALW abound. Examples are provided below to trace the progression of weapons
of this class, from the first one made to one of the latest to be created. They are as follows:
•
•

The Liberator (USA) – Defense Distributed (2013)
Rapid Additively Manufactured Ballistics Ordnance (RAMBO) – US Army (2017). Grenade
launcher – 48 out of 50 components of the weapon itself were 3D printed. Three of four
ammunition parts (grenades) were also 3D printed [30].

From the last example, one notices that the US Army has already almost entirely manufactured a grenade
launcher using 3D printing. If this trend continues, it will not take long for other armies to catch up, and
some of these armies could have links to non-state actors or could support state-sponsored terrorism.

IX. Drone Accessories
Drone accessories, like 3D printed cameras, landing gears, propellers, etc. are available online and can be
shipped to most countries, increasing risks of malevolent drone usage. The internet is full of websites
referring to ‘do-it-yourself’ drone kits with which one could build inexpensive lightweight drones. Drone
accessories, like camera holders, can be printed out too. For the motors, batteries at current technology
levels still need to be attached separately and cannot be 3D printed. However, a whole gamut of accessory
options is offered, ranging from customizable 3D printed drones with autopilot, to the more advanced
modular 3D printable drones designed to fly in flocks and communicate with each other, developed by the
Institute for Dynamic Systems and Control based out of Switzerland [31]. In Britain, terrorists may try to
use drones to commit atrocities or use 3D printers to build bombs, as Mark Rowley, Metropolitan Police
Assistant Commissioner and the country’s senior most counter terrorism officer, observed at the Counter
Terrorism Expo Conference in London [31].

X.

Nanotechnology

Three-dimensional printers using micro- and nanotechnology can result in micro-miniaturized 3D printed
products. Already, 3D printing is at a sufficiently advanced level to be able to print lithium-ion microbatteries of dimensions similar to those of a grain of sand (average diameter 0.0625mm-2mm). These
batteries were printed by a team of scientists based at Harvard University and the University of Illinois at
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Urbana-Champaign with precisely interlaced stacks of tiny battery electrodes, each of them thinner than a
strand of human hair (0.017-0.018mm diameter). A team from Urbana-Champaign had already worked on
a polymer ink as far back as in 2007, which emulates the way spiders spin silk, where protein solutions
solidify upon exiting the animal’s body to become silk. The researchers designed this new ink consisting
of two oppositely charged polymers. A syringe loaded with these liquid polymers squirts out the mixture,
which, when passed through a mixture of alcohol and water, coagulates into filaments [32]. Similarly, a
285-nanometer long racecar model has been printed at the Vienna University of Technology in four
minutes. The 3D printed car resembled the CAD file at a precision of plus or minus one nanometer, using
a method known as two-photon lithography [33]. Of possible concern in the future is the manufacture of
nanobots, once methods to control nanojets (streams of 3D printing polymers emanating from a printer at
the nanoscale) are sophisticated enough to realize rapid 3D printing of complicated shapes. Research into
the improvement of nanofabrication technology has been ongoing at the Seoul National University, with
initial findings published in 2014. Nanobots could be used for military surveillance purposes if fitted with
miniature cameras, or they could be used to disrupt an enemy’s communications systems while being
extremely difficult to trace. Micro-fish the width of human hair—developed at the University of San
Diego, California with 3D printing—were designed to deliver drugs at specific locations within the
human body [34] but could possibly be used for more pernicious purposes like assassinations by
delivering toxic material in the same manner. Customs would be challenged because many handheld or
doorframe metal detectors would not have sensitivities necessary for tracing objects of nano-dimensions.
In a fast-paced airport or cargo environment, where clearing passengers and goods swiftly is of utmost
importance, detecting objects of such minuscule proportions is bound to be a major enforcement
challenge.
While we are still grappling with the strategic trade control ramifications of 3D printing, it may be apt to
point out at this juncture that the Northwestern University’s (Chicago) International Institute of
Nanotechnology has received a grant of $8.5 million from the US Department of Defense to develop the
4D printer, meant to function at the nanoscale, which would advance materials sciences, chemistry and
defense-related fields with what is being called ‘smart’ materials that are sensitive to other materials,
signals and the environment. “The 4D printed objects would be able to transform and morph to fulfill
other functions, due to encoded information on nanomaterials. The printers themselves work through a
team of pens producing the materials which can act on numerous levels as it is imbued with electronic and
chemical elements” [35]. Technology is moving so fast that updating the laws accordingly becomes a
Herculean task.

XI. Cybersecurity
Cyberattacks on 3D printers have become a new worry for policymakers because the CAD files used in
printing are vulnerable to such attacks. “The technology comes at a price, and the price is the possibility
of stealing those files or intellectual property or sabotage,” observed New York University Professor
Nikhil Gupta. According to Gupta, hackers could steal sensitive CAD files for weaponry or other parts, or
enemies could introduce a bug through a cyberattack into a sensitive file or the printer’s firmware, which
would cause a high-end product to fail. The FBI also raised concerns about hacked 3D printers, designed
to manufacture bombs, exploding at unexpected times due to manufacturing defects introduced by
external parties through cyberattacks on the 3D printing blueprints [36]. Further, according to a RAND
Corporation paper under their Security 2040 series, “Attacks will begin to have real-world consequences
beyond the digital space and will increasingly blur the lines between kinetic and non-kinetic threats” [3].

XII. DNA
Finally, companies have recently begun printing and selling DNA. In this case, ‘printing’ means making a
high number of copies in a minimal amount of time. While this practice could lead to medical
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advancements or to better genetically engineered crops, it may also create significant problems in the
Customs and cross-border trade domain. The CEO of a San Francisco-based enterprise, Cambrian
Genomics, speaks openly about the possibility that everybody may soon be able to create novel creatures.
He goes on to state that some viruses may be created, such as Ebola or Smallpox, with around 18,000
base pairs of DNA, which could kill millions of people at a single stroke [37]. Similarly, exotic life forms
may be created. Cross-border wildlife trafficking may, as a result, assume completely different
characteristics, an idea that seems straight out of ‘Jurassic Park.’ The concept of such incredible power
through 3D printing, though not a worry of the immediate future, may be a point worthy of consideration
if it is in the hands of potential terrorists with no global boundaries whatsoever. Though it must be
accepted in today’s times that 3D printing technology has not reached such epic proportions as to be able
to genetically engineer whole organisms, it is entirely feasible that after a decade or two at its present,
galloping pace, this unimaginable feat may become a possibility. The sky seems to be the limit.

XIII.
•

•

•

•

•

Recommendations – Navigating the Gray Areas

Governments must swiftly realize the need to anticipate 3D printing-related problems and
customize laws to counter their unchecked spread in advance. Customs authorities, licensing
agencies and other enforcement departments need to be sensitized to this technology. Much of the
problem for enforcement agencies here boils down to the basic issue of the use of the allpervading Internet as a tool for spreading blueprints. It may be prudent to lay down strategic trade
control regulations for blueprints and virtual diagrams, CAD files of arms, weapons parts and
dual-use technology parts (basically the ‘knowhow’) because current regulations fail to even
meaningfully govern the 3D printing of guns, etc., as there is a lack of any effective means of
controlling and standardizing the distribution of CAD files online. Designs specifically for items
of concern can be controlled. Precedence exists for this. The Multilateral Export Control Regimes
(MECRs) typically control “technology.” For guns, military equipment and controlled dual-use
technology, controls on intangible technology already exist. Perhaps controlling the operating
systems of 3D printers may prove to be useful. However, an enabling technology such as 3D
printing may get partially stifled in the process. The pros and cons need to be weighed carefully
here.
The MECRs can control the transfer of 3D printers. Precedence can be seen in the case of
Computer-Numerically Controlled (CNC) machines, presently controlled by the Nuclear
Suppliers Group and the Wassenaar Arrangement, as this type of machinery is capable of
manufacturing highly-specialized components for use in military and nuclear applications. Arms,
technology, and software associated with arms production fall under the purview of the
Wassenaar Arrangement. Specialist 3D printers should be controlled if the equipment possesses
advanced destructive capabilities [38]. Even at the domestic retail level, background checks of
persons can be instituted before any printers are sold.
Governments should institute controls on the supply of 3D printing-related material globally. This
is probably a tough ask considering that with most dual-use technology or with materials that can
be used in manufacturing different products, banning plastics and metals which can be used for
various purposes can cause difficulty to other industries. It is also impossible to keep track of the
identities of every importer globally procuring these materials.
Tracking and disrupting the functioning of those who are sharing and downloading ‘sensitive’ 3D
files online. Searching for common files, platforms and mapping those who have viewed and
shared such files is perhaps a logical step to put an end to what is a very handy resource for
terrorists and criminals.
To thwart cyberattacks, following an example of the Danish corporation Create It REAL,
heightened encryption processes can be used to keep CAD files from being altered remotely. It
should be ensured that the decryption is possible at the 3D printer itself, to maintain the sanctity
of the file during its journey through cyberspace [36]. Further, it may be worthwhile to consider,

10

Banerjee: Arms and the Man: Strategic Trade Control Challenges of 3D Printing
International Journal of Nuclear Security, Vol.4, No.1, 2018

“creating local interconnected networks, rather than connecting a 3-D printer to the entire internet
and requiring a security key before an item can be printed” [36].

XIV. Conclusion
As long as human beings have existed, there have been emerging technologies and discoveries. Novel
technologies were developed, however, at a far slower pace in the years preceding 1800 CE or so,
following which there began an exponential increase in new products and services. However, even when
something as elementary as fire was first harnessed by man, it would surely have been a seemingly
miraculous asset and would have opened the doors to many possibilities to make the quality of human life
better—to stay warm, produce light in the darkness, ward off beasts in the wild, and so on. While running
the risk of sounding Marxian, one could perhaps rightfully observe that once humankind developed a
sense of material possession, that same fire—giver of light, warmth and a sense of security—became a
tool in the hands of some to burn their fellow human beings, either to defend their own, or worse, to loot
others’ possessions. Similarly, over time, many new technologies have caused harm as well as good.
Whether one considers basic tools like knives or more sophisticated armaments like guns, rocket
technology (to carry humans to space or to bomb other nations), nuclear technology, drone technology
(for taking innocuous pictures or for military reconnaissance and warfare), or even the internet and
associated computer software, they can all pose different risks depending on whom is in control of this
technology and power. They are all fit to be ‘dual-use’ items, even if in some instances in a more
unconventional sense. Now, 3D printing looks slated to be the next big thing: it is one such technology
impacting society which will touch our lives all for the better, while also enabling new avenues for
destruction to enter into this world.
In May 2015, the US Government proposed amendments to its International Traffic in Arms Regulations
(ITAR) to choke off distribution of 3D printable gun models as part of the President’s Export Control
Reform (ECR) initiative. If implemented, these changes would hurt any individual’s or group’s ability to
share most gun-related design files online, increasing chances of legal consequences [35]. From the 3D
printing and strategic trade controls standpoint, the most interesting changes come by way of the new
revised definition proposed by the US government for ‘technical data,’ which is stated thus: “Paragraph
(a)(1) also sets forth a broader range of formats that ‘technical data’ may take, such as diagrams, models,
formulae, tables, engineering designs and specifications, computer-aided design files, manuals or
documentation, or electronic media, that may constitute ‘technical data’”. Furthermore, a proposed
revision to the term ‘required’ in ITAR would make any export of information regarding the creation of a
particular weapon as serious of a crime as the export of the weapon itself and could result in millions of
dollars in fines or even imprisonment. For example, it would be illegal to make the digital blueprints for a
3D model of a gun available on the internet via forums, Youtube, social media, or in any other manner
[35]. The journey of a thousand miles begins with a single step, as they say, and this seems to be that step,
and one in the right direction.
The question often arises as to why a belligerent state or a terrorist outfit would resort to 3D printing
nuclear components and other smaller weapons, when they could perhaps steal nuclear and radiological
material or create improvised explosive or nuclear devices. I argue that while it is true that terrorists may
resort to those means, 3D printers considerably reduce manufacturing time and cost effectiveness. Also,
while it may be just one more technological addition in the increasingly sophisticated 21st century, 3D
printing certainly provides another means to create weapons of mass destruction in the future. Prevention
and precaution are better than cure, and there may even be no cure for certain acts of terrorism, especially
when they involve highly damaging nuclear material.
Furthermore, many transactions which traditionally required physical control by Customs and other
enforcement agencies at international borders are likely to undergo a sea change if blueprints of various
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3D printed products are transferred via the internet. As physical controls become less effective,
intelligence agencies must increasingly work to secure the digital borders. A malevolent actor who has a
printer and access to raw materials would still require advanced software and digital designs to create
dangerous weapons. New production software shall thus become some of the most highly prized and
classified secrets of governments. Arms control may become highly difficult, if not impossible. Weapons
could be far more easily disguised. Terrorists could lose their dependency upon developed countries for
their supplies, as highlighted earlier in the examples of replication of military equipment and the
irrelevance of international clandestine smuggling routes. There may also be further implications for
counterfeiting and anti-counterfeiting [39]. Unless there is effective monitoring of 3D printing code
capabilities, a terrorist group with the machines, blueprints and printing “ink,” or material, may be able to
re-arm almost at will. Such possibilities have led to terms such as “Open Source Jihad” gaining currency.
In 2010, the terror group al Qaeda released an article in its online magazine ‘Inspire’ which provided
directions to manufacture a bomb in the family kitchen. It was a watershed moment. Though the kitchen
bomb may be rudimentary, it leads one to worry what might happen when bomb designers as well as
bombers may both have 3D printers. In that case, a far superior device may become easily accessible [40].
Three-dimensional printers are poised to become a classic dual-use technology and thus hard to limit
without curtailing their many benefits. We may have to completely rethink trade control law and
enforcement [41] and begin working on the issue with immediacy. Humanity appears to be on the brink of
a manufacturing revolution and a complete paradigm shift, where strategic trade control laws may
become almost unenforceable. The need of the hour is, therefore, for security agencies globally to acquire
topical training and equipment to prevent the harm that this new technology could one day cause. The
need is also for technical and policy-making communities to ensure that sensitive technologies such as
this remain in the right hands. The MECRs should introduce necessary controls to this end. The United
States, the EU and its member states, Japan and China—the path-breakers in the world of 3D printing—
should also consider introducing strategic trade control laws based on the parameters described above.
Manufacturers and retailers would also be wise to keep an eye on the ongoing story of 3D printing to
ensure they are up to date with the evolving strategic trade control laws.
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XV. ANNEXURE I
The following is a brief timeline of 3D printing to inform the reader of the history of 3D printing and
update the reader on its current state:
•

1981- Hideo Kodama of Nagoya Municipal Industrial Research Institute publishes the
first account of a working photopolymer rapid prototyping system.

•

1984- Charles Hull (founder of 3D systems) invents stereolithography (SLA) – which is patented
in 1987. The technology allows one to take a 3D model and use a laser to etch it into a special
liquid (photopolymer).

•

Late-1980s- Emanuel Sachs of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) with his team
invents 3D printing and patents it [Patent No. 5204055] [33].

•

1992- 3D systems produce the first stereolithography (SLA) 3D printer/resin printer machine.
The startup company DTM, which was acquired in 2001 by 3D Systems, produces the first SLS
machine in the same year. This machine is similar to SLA technology but uses a powder (and
laser) instead of a liquid.

•

2000- The first multi-colour 3D printer was engineered by Z Corp. this year.

•

2008- The first 3D prosthetic leg is produced. Further, Shapeways – a website market for 3D
models – launches. It is much like Amazon or Ebay, where individuals can upload 3D models of
objects which can be bought or sold online. Shapeways is a Dutch-founded, New York-based 3D
printing marketplace and service startup company. As of June, 2012, Shapeways printed and sold
over one million user-created objects [42]. Provided one has a 3D printer at home, it is possible to
print out the Shapeways offerings.

•

2013- Cody Wilson of Defense Distributed is asked to remove designs for the world’s first 3D
printed gun (made of plastic) and the domain is seized. It was classified under Category I of
United States Munitions List (USML), which deals with firearms and a violation of the
International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). The ITAR controls the export and import of
defence-related articles and services on the USML [43]. These regulations implement the
provisions of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) and are described in Title 22 (that of Foreign
Relations), Chapter 1 (Department of State), Subchapter M of the Code of Federal Regulations.
Any company that manufactures, sells, or exports defence items such as guns, dual-use items
(with either civilian or military applications) like aircraft engine parts, or related technical
information, requires a registration with the US Dept. of State and export licenses for any
restricted items. The plans were downloaded over 100,000 times in the two days before the US
Department of State demanded that Defense Distributed retract the plans [44]. While the rapid
downloading of this CAD file exhibits the popularity of firearms and resistance to certain laws,
this can also be perceived as an example of how challenging it is to control a CAD file. The CAD
file could then easily be shared privately via email or posted on a multitude of file-sharing
websites, including those on the dark web or deep web. This would make the file itself impossible
to remove from the Internet entirely as it would have proliferated on myriad torrent sites. The
dangers associated with proliferation of maleficent technological knowhow are real. Traditional
Customs techniques of inspection at the border may collapse before a virtual CAD onslaught and
a new approach needs to be figured out by Customs and global trade/licensing agencies putting
their heads together.

•

2014- Boeing patents the first 3D printed part, a casing for a compressor inlet temperature sensor,
which will be used in the BE90-94B jet engine on Boeing 777 aircraft [45].
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•

2015- BMW makes a high-precision water pump wheel in a powertrain for their vehicle. This
component is subject to high stresses, consists of an aluminium alloy and has previously proven
its worth in the tough environment of motorsports [46]; Details emerge of a miniature 3D printed
jet engine from the US multinational firm General Electric that can rotate at 33,000 rpm—a
similar magnitude to that required for uranium-enriching centrifuges [47]. The analogy drawn
here intends to draw attention to the fact that both the nuclear and aerospace industries require
top-quality, high strength components; hence, 3D printing could soon be applicable to the
production of strategic trade-controlled items that are part of the nuclear fuel cycle.

•

2017- Mouse ovaries in Northwestern University; first residential house in Moscow; microcamera with eagle-eye vision for use in drones.
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XVI. ANNEXURE 2

Global Sales of 3D Printers
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